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BUSINESS LAW—CORPORATE PURPOSE AND BENEFIT CORPORATIONS—MAKING BENEFIT 
CORPORATION LEGISLATION WORK FOR SOCIALLY MINDED INVESTORS  
Cody McKinney* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
When it comes to business, there is money in morality. In 2018, according to The Forum 
for Sustainable and Responsible Investment1, sustainable and responsible investment assets 
expanded to $12.0 trillion in the United States.2 However, what happens when a company fails—
or potentially fails—to follow through with its promise of social impact? What recourse do 
investors have? The sale of Ben & Jerry's to the mega-corporation Unilever in 2000 offers some 
insight.3   
Ben & Jerry's began as a Vermont company in 1978 and became an exemplar social 
enterprise.4 Ben & Jerry's built a reputation for being environmentally conscious, taking care of 
its employees, and ensuring that its dairy sources operated humanely.5 Ben & Jerry's earned this 
reputation through practices such as rarely firing employees.6 Ben Cohen and Jerry Greenfield, the 
founders and majority shareholders of Ben & Jerry's, were as concerned with improving the 
community as making a profit.7 
 
*Cody McKinney is JD and MPS Candidate at the University of Arkansas Little Rock William H. Bowen 
1 A membership association that advances sustainable, responsible, and impact investing. 
2 The Forum for Sustainable and Responsible Investment, Report on US Sustainable, Responsible and 
Impact Investing Trends, USSIF (Oct. 31, 2018, 7:50:42 AM), https://www.ussif.org/blog_home.asp?Display=118. 
3 Antony Page & Robert A. Katz, The Truth about Ben and Jerry’s, STANFORD SOC. INNOVATION REV. 39, 
40-41 (2012).  
4 Id. at 39. 
5 Id. at 39. 
6 David Gelles, How the Social Mission of Ben & Jerry’s Survived Being Gobbled Up, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 
21, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/23/business/how-ben-jerrys-social-mission-survived-being-gobbled-
up.html. 
7 Page & Katz, supra note 3, at 39. 
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Unilever is one of the world's largest consumer goods companies.8 In 2000, Unilever was 
the owner of commonly known brands such as Vaseline, Lipton Tea, and Ragu.9 Additionally, 
Unilever was the world's largest ice cream maker.10  
With Ben & Jerry's sale to Unilever, some shareholders feared that the financial bottom-
line would become the only concern in Ben & Jerry's future.11  Investors had no guarantee Ben & 
Jerry's would continue to be the environmentally, socioeconomically, and animal-friendly 
corporation they had invested in initially.12 This problem led to Vermont becoming the second 
state to create benefit corporation legislation in 2011.13  
There is a long-standing legal debate about a business's duty to maximize shareholders' 
profits. Regardless of this debate, shareholder profit maximization is no longer the singular 
purpose of all for-profit businesses. Whether the commentary on profit maximization in Dodge v. 
Ford and eBay v. Newmark is dicta or law, the creation and adoption of benefit corporations, 
flexible purpose corporations, and low-profit limited liability corporations have provided a 
framework for corporations to pursue more than just profit.14 Still, how courts will enforce a 
corporation's purpose outside of profit maximization has yet to be tested. This note analyzes 
criticism of benefit corporation legislation and argues that The Benefit Corporation Act15 adds to 
the legal landscape in Arkansas because, although traditional corporations are free to practice 
corporate social responsibility and pursue some social purpose, benefit corporation legislation 
 
8 Id. 




11 Page & Katz, supra note 3, at 40. 
12 Id. 
13 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, §§ 21.01–08 (West 2020). 
14 Lyman Johnson, Pluralism in Corporate Form: Corporate Law and Benefit Corps., 25 REGENT U. L. REV. 
269, 269–70 (2013). 
15 ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-36-101 to -401 (West 2020).  





builds the foundation for shareholders to hold companies accountable for how they pursue public 
purposes. This note also acknowledges the weakness of the Arkansas Benefit Corporation Act with 
respect to holding benefit corporations accountable for serving their stated public purposes. 
Nonetheless, this note argues that applying the doctrine of parens patriae and encouraging benefit 
corporations to adopt a quasi-poison pill provision could significantly correct that shortcoming.  
Part II of this note addresses the origin and history of benefit corporations. It then reviews 
suggested enforcement strategies to ensure benefit corporations are fulfilling their public purposes. 
Part III examines the role benefit corporations play in Arkansas and how the benefit corporation 
legislation stands up against criticism and examines how the application of the doctrine of parens 
patriae could be applied to benefit corporations, flexible purpose corporations, and low-profit 
limited liability corporations. Further, this note recommends the adoption of a quasi-poison pill to 
strengthen the true value of benefit corporation legislation and to allow shareholders an avenue 
with which to hold entities they invest in accountable for the public purposes the entities claim to 
pursue.  
II. BACKGROUND 
The question of whether corporations exist to maximize shareholders' wealth is at the center 
of an ongoing argument in the United States. Some legal scholars point to the lack of cited authority 
in the landmark cases to dispel the shareholder's wealth maximization requirement as a myth.16 
Other legal scholars claim that a proper reading of the case law clearly establishes the wealth 
maximization duty.17 Regardless of which side is correct, there has been a growing social 
movement to acknowledge alternative corporate purposes beyond that of profit maximization.18 A 
 
16 Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 163, 166 (2008). 
17 David G. Yosifon, The Law of Corporate Purpose, 10 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 181, 187–94 (2014). 
18 Fredrick H. Alexander, The Capital Markets and Benefit Corporations, ABA (July 20, 2016), 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/blt/2016/07/05_ 
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majority of states have adopted a benefit corporation, flexible purpose corporation, and low-profit 
limited liability corporation legislation based on model legislation written by B Lab.19 The model 
legislation, and the statues adopted based on the model legislation, expressly provide for an entity 
to pursue public benefits in addition to shareholders' profits and creates a right of action that 
shareholders can utilize to ensure that the corporation's stated public benefit is pursued.20 However, 
the right of action laid out in the model legislation falls short of being effective and scholarly 
efforts are underway to remedy the shortcoming.21 
As this note discusses below, the private right of action created by benefit corporation 
legislation is limited by the business judgment rule.22 Under the business judgment rule, courts 
will accede to the business judgment of corporate executives,23 making it likely that any 
explanation given by benefit corporation executives for not pursuing the general or specific public 
purposes will be protected under the rule.  
The non-profit sector has done its part to develop a solution. B Lab has created a private 
certification for businesses that meet a certain level of social impact and gives the businesses they 
certify the designation of a B Corp.24 To achieve the B Corp certification, businesses must 
complete B Lab's "B Impact Assessment" and integrate stakeholder consideration into the 
 
alexander/. 
19 Mark J. Loewenstein, Benefit Corporation Law, 85 U. CIN. L. REV. 381, 381 (2017); B Lab is a nonprofit 
that serves the global movement of people using business as a force for good. See About B Lab, B LAB, 
https://bcorporation.net/about-b-lab (last visited Nov. 14, 2020). 
20 Model Benefit Corporation Legislation, BENEFIT CORP. (Apr. 17, 2017), 
https://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/Model%20benefit%20corp%20legislation%20_4_17_17.pdf. 
21 Jaime Lee, Benefit Corporations: A Proposal for Assessing Liability in Benefit Enforcement 
Proceedings, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 4, 1075, 1096 (2018). 
22 See infra Section II D. 
23 Id. 
24 See How to Become a B Corp, B LAB, https://www.bcorporation.net/become-a-b-corp/howto-become-a-
b-corp (last visited Feb. 27, 2020). 





governance structure of their businesses.25 The "B Impact Assessment" analyzes how a company 
interacts with its employees, customers, community, and environment.26  
A. Corporate Purpose Historically and Modern Alternatives  
In the United States, the pervading notion is that a corporation exists to maximize 
shareholders' profits. The 1919 case Dodge v. Ford from the Michigan Supreme Court is a 
landmark shareholder wealth maximization case.27 In Dodge, the court asserted in dictum that for-
profit corporations exist exclusively for the benefit of their shareholders and that a director's 
primary interest should be maximizing shareholders' profit.28  Absent Dodge, there is little 
authority on the matter.29 It is essential to note Dodge is a state case, and no federal cases have 
addressed profit maximization since Dodge was decided. More recently, in eBay v. Newmark, a 
case primarily about minority shareholder rights, the Supreme Court of Delaware, arguably the 
court most proficient in handling business litigation, reaffirmed the duty of corporations to 
maximize shareholders' profits.30 Strangely in both eBay and Dodge, the courts fail to provide 
authority for their positions on the existence of a duty to maximize shareholders' profits.31 Many 
scholars have discussed this lack of authority, urging their peers to stop teaching profit 
maximization as law and, instead, acknowledge it as dicta.32 Of course, there is an argument 




27 M. Todd Henderson, Everything Old Is New Again: Lessons from Dodge v. Ford Motor Company 1–2 
(John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics Working Paper No. 373, 2007). 
28 Dodge v. Ford, 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919). 
29 Stout, supra note 16, at 166. 
30 eBay Domestic Holdings Inc v. Newark, 16 A.3d 1, 6 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
31 Yosifon, supra note 17, at 187–88; David B. Guenther, The Strange Case of the Missing Doctrine and the 
“Odd Exercise” of eBay: Why Exactly Must Corporations Maximize Profits to Shareholders?, 12 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 
3 427, 434–35 (2018).  
32 Stout, supra note 16, at 166. 
33 Yosifon, supra note 17, at 181.  
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One scholarly argument is that, although no binding authority is cited in Dodge v. Ford, proper 
readings of Unocal v. Mesa34 and Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.35 more 
clearly establish that the law requires directors to maximize shareholders' wealth.36 The Honorable 
Leo Stine argues that corporate directors usually have much discretion in how to pursue the 
interests of stockholders, but, in the context of a company's sale, the sole focus must be on getting 
the highest price for the sale.37 The argument regarding whether corporations have the singular 
duty to maximize shareholder profits continues. However, there has been a growing movement to 
acknowledge alternative corporate purposes beyond the concept of profit maximization. 
Maryland led the charge of this social movement in 2010 and became the first state to adopt 
a statute creating a benefit corporation as a possible business entity.38 As defined by most statutes, 
a benefit corporation is similar to a traditional corporation but legally has committed to a social 
purpose, accountability, and transparency.39 Following in Maryland's footsteps, thirty-five states 
have adopted benefit corporation legislation, and ten states have adopted flexible purpose 
corporation or low-profit limited liability corporation legislation.40 Flexible purpose corporations 
 
34 Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). 
35 Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1985). 
36 Yosifon, supra note 17, at 187–94. 
37 Honorable Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial: The Need for A Clear-Eyed Understanding of the 
Power and Accountability Structure Established by the Delaware General Corporation Law, 50 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV.  761, 773 (2015). 
38 Alexander, supra note 18.  
39 Loewenstein, supra note 19, at 382.  
40ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-36-101 to -401 (West 2020); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-2401 to -2442 (West 
2020); CAL. CORP. CODE § 14600 et seq. (West 2020) (benefit corporation) and Cal. Corp. Code § 2500 et seq. (West 
2020) (special purpose corporations); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-101-501 to -509 (West 2020); D.C. CODE §§ 29-
1301.01 to 29-1304.01 (West 2020); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 361 to 368 (West 2020); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 607.601 
to 607.613 (West 2020); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 420D-1 to 420D-13.805 (West 2020); ID. CODE ANN. §§ 30-2001 to 
2013 (West 2020); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. §§ 40/1 to 40/5.01 (West 2020); IN. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1.3-1-1 to 10-5 
(West 2020); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. XXIII, Ch. 271B et seq. (West 2020); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 1801 to 1832 
(West 2020); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156E, §§ 1 to 16 (West 2020); MD. CODE ANN., Corps. & Ass’ns. §§ 5-6C-
01 to 08 (West 2020); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 13-C, § 1801 to 1832 (West 2020); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 304A.001 to 
304A.301 (West 2020); MT. CODE ANN. §§ 35-1-1401 to -1412 (West 2020); NE. REV. STAT. Ann. §§ 21-401 to 21-
414 (West 2020); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 78B.010-190 (West 2020); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293-C:1 to C:13 
(West 2020); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 14A:18-1 to :18-11 (West 2020); N.Y. BUS. CORP. Law §§ 1701 to 1709 (West 
2020); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 1201 to 1210 (West 2020); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 60.750 to 770 (West 2020); 





are similar to benefit corporations but have eased qualifying and reporting requirements.41 Low-
profit limited liability corporations simplify compliance with Internal Revenue Service rules for 
program-related investments and act as a midpoint between non-profit and for-profit investing.42 
Even though benefit corporations, flexible purpose corporations, and low-profit limited liability 
corporations remain for-profit entities, these corporate structures explicitly allow for the pursuit of 
public benefits in addition to shareholders' profits, promote increased transparency, and strengthen 
accountability. However, benefit corporations, flexible purpose corporations, nor low profit 
limited liability corporations get tax benefits from the IRS like the tax-exemption for 501c(3)s.  
B. Model Legislation for Benefit Corporations   
B Lab is a non-profit company that has worked towards uniformity across the states' 
varying benefit corporation legislation.43 B Lab created model legislation (Model Legislation), 
and, while not all benefit corporation statutes directly incorporated the model legislation, most 
have been influenced by it.44 B Lab's Model Legislation was created to maximize the advantages 
of expertise, by taking into account input from the states and business leaders; consistency, by 
uniformity between states; conformity, by adapting benefit corporation legislation to fit within the 
 
15 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 3301 to 3331 (West 2020); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 7-5.3-1 to -13 (West 2020); S.C. CODE 
ANN. §§ 33-38-110 et seq. (West 2020); TN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-28-101 to -109 (West 2020); TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE 
ANN. §§ 21.951 to 21.959 (West 2020); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 16-10B-101 to -402 (West 2020); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 
11A, §§ 21.01 to .08 (West 2020); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-782 to -791 (West 2020); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 
23B.25.005 to .150 (West 2020); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 31F-1-101 to -501 (West 2020); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 204.101 
to .401 (West 2020). 
41 Derek A. Ridgway, Flexible Purpose Corporation vs. Benefit Corporation, HANSONBRIDGETT (Sept. 4, 
2012), https://www.hansonbridgett.com/Publications/articles/2012-09-flexible-purpose?pdf=1. 
42 Caryn Capriccioso, Rick Zwetsch, Erin Shaver, Who is the L3C Entrepreneur?, INTERSECTOR PARTNERS, 
1, 12 (2012), 
https://www.americansforcommunitydevelopment.org/downloads/Who%20is%20the%20L3C%20Entrepreneur_Fal
l%202012rfs.pdf. 
43 Loewenstein, supra note 19, at 381.  
44 Id. at 382. 
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structure of traditional corporate code; and economic development, by giving investors and social 
enterprise the tools they need to succeed.45  
The Model Legislation requires that a benefit corporation include a purpose clause in its 
articles of incorporation, creating a general public benefit that has a positive impact on society or 
the environment.46 Additionally, the Model Legislation requires a benefit corporation to produce 
an annual report explaining how the benefit corporation pursued that general public benefit.47 The 
report must be issued to shareholders, made available on the company's web site, and reported to 
the Secretary of State in the company's state of incorporation.48 Many states have modified the 
reporting requirements of the Model Legislation by altering how often entities must create the 
report or by mandating that the report only be produced to shareholders and not the general 
public.49 
For publicly-traded benefit corporations, the Model Legislation requires that the annual 
report include an opinion from an independent Benefit Director.50 The opinion must address 
whether the benefit corporation acted in pursuit of its general public purpose and whether the 
directors and officers contemplated the impact of their actions.51 If the Benefit Director determines 
that the entity did not act in accordance with its stated public purpose or the directors failed to 
contemplate the impact of their decisions, then the Benefit Director identifies the contributing 
circumstances in the report.52 Additionally, the Model Legislation provides for a benefit 
enforcement proceeding wherein shareholders may state a claim for failure of the benefit 
 
45 The Model Legislation, B LAB, https://benefitcorp.net/attorneys/model-legislation (last visited Nov. 14, 
2020). 
46 Model Benefit Corporation Legislation, supra note 20, at § 201(a). 
47 Id. at § 401(a). 
48 Id. at § 402. 
49 Loewenstein, supra note 19, at 385. 
50 Model Benefit Corporation Legislation, supra note 20, at § 302(c). 
51 Id. at § 401. 
52 Id. 





corporation to pursue its general public purpose or any specific public purpose as included in the 
corporation's articles.53  
In states that have adopted the entire Model Legislation, the benefit enforcement 
proceeding is the exclusive remedy against the benefit corporation, its directors, or officers for 
these claims.54 However, for reasons explained below, benefit enforcement proceedings lack 
genuine force, and are therefore illusory.55  
There are three primary reasons why most states' enforcement provisions lack 
effectiveness. First, it is unlikely that a board of directors would authorize a non-monetary action 
against itself.56 Second, when a shareholder brings a benefit enforcement proceeding the board of 
directors of the benefit corporation is entitled to appoint a special litigation committee to consider 
the action or determine how the matter should be resolved, and the business judgment rule makes 
it unlikely a shareholder would succeed in a derivative suit.57 Third, no cause of action is created 
for the persons with the most incentive to sue the benefit corporation, the beneficiaries of its 
claimed public interest.58  
C. Shareholder Enforcement of a Benefit Corporation's Public Purposes 
In light of these hurdles, it is unsurprising that there has been no litigation around benefit 
enforcement proceedings to date.  Of the benefit enforcement legislation enacted thus far, Hawaii 
has arguably come closest to allowing a benefit corporation to be held accountable. Hawaii altered 
the Model Legislation to provide shareholders and directors the express power to enforce public 
 
53 Id. at § 305. 
54 Loewenstein, supra note 19, at 387.  
55 Id. at 388.  
56 Id. at 387. 
57 Id. at 388. 
58 Id. 
McKinney: Business Law–Corporate Purpose and Benefit Corporations–Making Be




benefit purposes, corporate purposes, and the director standard of conduct.59 In Hawaii, directors 
must consider how each of their actions affects shareholders and the pursuit of the corporation's 
stated public benefits.60 Even so, beneficiaries remain barred from bringing suit.  
As discussed below, there have been several suggestions to strengthen benefit corporation 
law that would enable a benefit corporation's general public purpose and specific public purpose 
to be enforced.  
Another potential option may be to empower a state's Attorney General, an office that 
historically has served as the state's implicit guardian of charity, to remedy breaches of fiduciary 
duties under a tradition grounded in English common law, parens patriae.61 While political and 
financial considerations may hinder enforcement through the state's Attorney General62, parens 
patriae could be adapted to enforce follow-through with the stated public purposes of benefit 
corporations.  
Under B Lab's Model Legislation, it is challenging for shareholders to state a claim because 
the only cause of action is derived from the benefit enforcement proceeding. However, if benefit 
corporation law were strengthened or the Attorney General was permitted to bring action against 
a benefit corporation as the implicit guardian of charity, enforcement would be possible, and the 
business judgment rule would no longer prevent any enforcement of a benefit corporation's public 




59 Lyman Johnson, Emerging Issues in Social Enterprise: Pluralism in Corporate Form: Corporate Law and 
Benefit Corps., 25 REGENT U. L. REV. 269, 289 (2013). 
60 Id. 
61 Joseph Mead & Michael Pollack, Courts, Constituencies, and the Enforcement of Fiduciary Duties in the 
Nonprofit Sector, 77 U. PITT. L. REV. 281, 297 (2016). 
62 Id.  





D.  Proposed Solutions for the Lack of Shareholder Recourse When a Benefit Corporation 
Fails to Purse its Stated General or Specific Public Purposes 
The proper balance between corporate profit maximization and the pursuit of public 
benefits has not been struck.63 In keeping with the general tenets of corporation law, the Model 
Legislation states that a shareholder who wishes to pursue derivative litigation against the benefit 
corporation must first take his or her demand to the board of directors.64 The business judgment 
rule protects a refusal by the board to comply with the demand.65 The business judgment rule 
provides: 
[A] director and her decision are protected from legal attack if: first, she and her 
colleagues made a judgment or decision; second, the decision makers were free 
from disabling conflicts of interest; third, they exercised some (not necessarily 
reasonable) care in informing themselves about the matter decided; and fourth, they 
had a rational (not necessarily reasonable) basis for the decision they made.66  
If a shareholder seeks to compel a benefit corporation to comply with its general or specific public 
purpose by way of the benefit enforcement proceeding, the benefit corporation's directors will 
likely offer a reasonable explanation as to why or how they are pursuing the stated public purpose. 
This explanation will be protected by the business judgment rule.67 This leaves the shareholder in 
the same position as before the benefit enforcement proceeding, with no way to ensure his or her 
investment is being used in line with the stated public purpose. Legal scholars have offered 
multiple solutions to this problem.68  
 
63 Stephen I. Glover et al., A Corporate Paradigm Shift: Public Benefit Corporations, GIBSON DUNN (Aug. 
9, 2016), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/documents 
/Corporate-Paradigm-Shift-Public-Benefit-Corporations.pdf [https://perma.cc/8MUQ-8H29.] 
64 Loewenstein, supra note 20, at 388. 
65 Id. 
66 Douglas M. Branson, The Rule That Isn’t a Rule- The Business Judgment Rule, 36 VALPARAISO U. L. REV.  
631, 635 (2002). 
67 See Gerard V. Mantese & Emily S. Fields, The Business Judgment Rule, Mich. B.J., January 2020, at 31–
32 (explaining the common application of the business judgment rule). 
68 Lee, supra note 21, at, 1096.  
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Some propose the abandonment of the benefit corporation structure altogether.69 Kent 
Greenfield, professor at Boston College Law School, suggests scrapping the entire idea of benefit 
corporations in favor of electing government officials who are willing to make the duties owed by 
all corporations clear and enforceable. 70 Additionally, Phil Peters, co-chair of the Corporation 
Committee of the California Bar, suggests focusing on flexible purpose corporations, an alternative 
to traditional corporations and benefit corporations available in California that provides 
shareholders more control over a benefit corporation's pursuit of its public purpose.71 
Other solutions focus on strengthening benefit corporation law to allow more remedies as 
a check on corporate action. 72 For example, stakeholders who can show injury to a legitimate 
interest could be granted standing.73 The burden would then shift to the board of the benefit 
corporation to show a legitimate corporate purpose.74 If that burden is met, then the burden would 
shift back to the stakeholder to show that the directors have less injurious means of achieving the 
same ends.75 Additionally, procedural requirements may be strengthened by imposing dividend 
caps, requiring the benefit corporation to identify the stakeholders it seeks to serve, and requiring 
transparency in the extent to which its social purpose is considered when making business 
decisions76 Accountability provisions in current benefit corporation law could also be improved 
by uniformly requiring an expansive approach to the position of Benefit Director and requiring 
that, as the entity grows, additional benefit directors will be added.77 
 




72 Steven Munch, Improving the Benefit Corporation: How Traditional Governance Mechanisms Can 
Enhance the Innovative New Business Form, 7 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL'Y 170, 190 (2012). 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 190–191. 
76 Munch, supra note 72, at 191. 
77 Id. at 193. 





Even if the law is strengthened, the government begins to hold all corporations responsible, 
or flexible purpose corporations are utilized, the question of determining liability in the face of the 
business judgment rule remains. Jamie Lee, from Cornell Law School, offers the following quasi-
mathematical equation as a proposal for determining whether a court should impose liability in a 
benefit enforcement proceeding. 
(Kind of Benefit)(Profit)(Time) 
(Time Lag of Benefit)78 
"Kind of Benefit" refers to the size and kind of the social benefit pursued.79 "Profit" refers to an 
average of the net positive income that a benefit corporation has collected since its origin.80 "Time" 
refers to the life of the benefit corporation.81 "Time Lag of Benefit" refers to the length of time 
needed for the benefit to be realized.82 A court would weigh the factors realizing that some public 
benefits are more important than others, and profitability takes time.83  
All the solutions to increase the accountability of benefit corporations to the social purpose 
above are viable but require the adoption of new laws and new processes of enforcement. Even so, 
these solutions are still limited to shareholders bringing suit without the possibility of recovering 
damages. As discussed below, one established alternative avoids the deterring effect of the lack of 
damages and increases the likelihood of corporate accountability by placing the reigns of 





78 Lee, supra note 21, at 1096. 
79 Lee, supra note 21, at 1096. 
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IV. MAXIMIZING THE BENEFIT CORPORATION FOR SOCIALLY CONSCIOUS INVESTORS 
In 2014, Arkansas adopted the benefit corporation legislation based mainly on B Lab's 
model legislation.84 However, benefit corporation legislation in Arkansas has not significantly 
been utilized.85 While there is a good argument that this underutilization is due to traditional 
corporations' ability to pursue purposes outside of profit maximization, the benefit corporation 
legislation still has a definite purpose. The real value of the benefit corporation legislation in 
Arkansas is to allow socially conscious investors an avenue to ensure that their investment is being 
put to the purpose a corporation claims it is pursuing. However, the problem remains that the 
benefit enforcement proceeding is the sole cause of action.86 The benefit enforcement proceeding 
alone is not likely to comfort socially conscious individuals. Electing an attorney general who will 
enforce a benefit corporation's public purpose under the doctrine of parens patriae would begin to 
give investors adequate assurances their desired pursuit of public purposes would be enforced. 
More reliable assurances could come from encouraging the adoption of a quasi-poison pill that 
allows shareholders to purchase severely discounted shares of the corporation in the event that the 
benefit corporation's board decides to change its general or specific public purposes.  
A. Benefit Corporations in Arkansas 
Arkansas enacted benefit corporation legislation in 2014.87 However, in the six years since 
the adoption of benefit corporation legislation in Arkansas, only a total of thirteen benefit 
organizations have incorporated under the act.88 To understand why more entrepreneurs in 
Arkansas are not taking advantage of the legislation and why the slow start is expected and benign, 
 
84 ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-36-101 – 4-36-401 (West 2020). 
85 Ark. Sec. State, Search Incorporations, Cooperatives, Banks and Insurance Companies, Ark. Sec. State 
(2020), https://www.sos.arkansas.gov/corps/search_corps.php. 
86 ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-36-305 (West 2020). 
87 ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-36-101 – 4-36-401 (West 2020). 
88 Ark. Sec. State, supra note 85. 





it is important to examine the arguments for and against benefit corporations. This examination 
requires attention to the necessity of benefit corporation legislation and what purpose such 
legislation plays in the broader legal landscape. 
As discussed above, the benefit corporation legislation exists to allow an entity to pursue 
both social goals and shareholder profits. The Arkansas Benefit Corporation Act does precisely 
that by stating, "a benefit corporation shall have a purpose of creating a general public benefit."89 
A general public benefit is defined as "a material positive impact on society and the environment, 
taken as a whole, assessed against a third-party standard, from the business and operations of a 
benefit corporation."90 The Arkansas Benefit Corporation Act also allows a corporation to declare 
a specific public purpose; however, this declaration does not obviate the corporation's adherence 
to its general public purpose.91  
Additionally, the Arkansas Benefit Corporation Act requires benefit corporation directors 
to consider the interests of stakeholders other than shareholders, including, but not limited to, 
employees, the workforce in the supply chain, customers, and the environment.92 The Act also 
makes clear that directors are not to be held personally liable for monetary damages arising from 
the failure of the benefit corporation to pursue general or specific public benefits.93 Shareholders 
may only avail themselves of the benefit enforcement proceeding if a benefit corporation fails to 
create or pursue its stated general or specific public purposes.94 
Critics contend that benefit corporations are unnecessary and complicate the legal 
landscape. The debatable necessity of benefit corporation legislation is really an offshoot of the 
 
89 ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-36-201(a) (West 2020). 
90 ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-36-103(a)(5) (West 2020). 
91 ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-36-201(2) (West 2020). 
92 ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-36-303 (West 2020). 
93 Id. 
94 ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-36-305 (West 2020). 
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argument regarding whether shareholder profit maximization is dicta or settled law.95 Critics of 
benefit corporation legislation point out that traditional corporations can—and do—pursue 
agendas outside profit maximization.96 An example of a traditional corporation pursuing public 
benefits in Arkansas is Tacos 4 Life. Tacos 4 Life, a Central Arkansas based Limited Liability 
Corporation (LLC), was founded with the mission that for every taco, rice bowl, quesadilla, salad 
or nachos purchased, a hungry child receives a meal.97 There are even independent standards for 
interested parties to measure a company's corporate social responsibility (CSR).98 Corporations 
commonly release CSR reports of their own accord.   
Some claim that benefit corporation legislation legitimizes the arguments that shareholder 
maximization is law and creates more uncertainty, not less.  A strong argument has been made that 
corporation law that uses the language "all lawful purposes" is sufficiently broad enough to allow 
a business to pursue social ends.99 This argument is augmented by highlighting the common 
misunderstanding of cases involving shareholder primacy. Proponents say that the business 
judgment rule allows directors ample leeway to justify CSR.100 These criticisms lead some 
opponents to assert that benefit corporation law does more damage than good.101 The critics claim 
that, by creating an alternative form of incorporation that mandates a general public purpose, 
benefit corporation legislation has strengthened the argument that a traditional corporation acting 
on a social motivation is inappropriate.102  
 
95 Amy K. Verbos & Stephanie Black, Benefit Corporations as a Distraction: An Overview and Critique, 36 
BUS. AND PRO. ETHICS J. 229, 258 (2017). 
96 Verbos & Black, supra note 95, at 241. 
97 Tacos 4 Life, Eat a Meal. Give a Meal, Tacos 4 Life (2018), https://tacos4life.com/mission/. 
98 Michael Hopkins, Measurement of Corporate Social Responsibility, 6 INT. J. MGMT. AND DECISION 
MAKING 213,218 (2005). 
99 Verbos & Black, supra note 95, at 237–38. 
100 Id. at 243. 
101 Id. 
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The business judgment rule in Arkansas is a presumption that the officers of a corporation 
acted on an informed basis, in good faith, and in an honest belief that their actions were in the best 
interest of the corporation.103 The business judgment rule neither asserts that all decisions by 
corporate officers must be in the interest of maximizing profit, nor does it exclude social, 
environmental, or economic motivations as legitimate. The broad interpretation of the business 
judgment rule is supported by the social undertakings of businesses such as Tacos 4 Life discussed 
above.104  
 These arguments fail to see the true value of benefit corporation legislation: the ability for 
socially conscious shareholders to ensure that their investments are being used not only for returns 
but also to pursue the public benefits claimed by a business entity.  
 The failure to see the actual value of benefit corporation legislation accentuates the 
argument that the sole cause of action, a benefit enforcement proceeding, is illusory. But, if the 
Attorney General will adopt his or her rightful role as the state's implicit guardian of charity, and 
if benefit corporations start to offer a quasi-poison pill that allows current shareholders to be 
offered shares at a severely discounted price in the event a board wishes to change its general or 
specific public purposes, socially conscious investing would find a home in Arkansas.  
B. Parens Patriae 
Benefit corporation legislation is necessary and helpful.  In Arkansas, The Benefit 
Corporation Act is necessary because it provides a way for shareholders to enforce the creation 
and pursuit of a general public purpose and may provide the State Attorney General with an avenue 
of enforcement under parens patriae.    
 
103 Long v. Lampton, 324 Ark. 511, 522 (1996). 
104 Tacos 4 Life, supra note 97. 
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The concept of parens patriae is a remnant of the English constitutional system.105 As the 
constitutional system developed, the King retained certain powers.106 Initially, the doctrine of 
parens patriae acknowledged the King's capacity to act as a parent to the country, including the 
capacity to act as superintendent to all charitable uses.107  The doctrine of parens patriae was 
brought as part of the English legal system to the American colonies and subsequently adopted 
into the common law of the United States.108 Parens patriae in the United States generally 
recognizes that the State, usually through its Attorney General, is the ultimate beneficiary of 
charitable trusts.109 As such, the Attorney General has the authority to enforce the public benefit 
of a non-profit organization or the terms of a charitable trust.110  However, in some states, the 
power to represent the public's interest is left to the district attorneys.111  In either case, the state, 
through the Attorney General or district attorneys, is the primary guardian of charity.112 Some 
states have codified the attorney general's role as the public's guardian of charity either by statute 
or in the enumeration of the powers of the attorney general.113  However, the majority of states 
still rely on the common law's recognition of the attorney general as the implicit guardian of 
charity.114   
The doctrine of parens patriae could be applied by Arkansas' Attorney General, or any other 
individual state's Attorney General, to enforce the general and specific public purposes of benefit 
corporations. Just like the public is the end beneficiary of the public purpose of non-profit entities, 
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the public will be the beneficiary of the stated general and specific public purposes of benefit 
corporations, flexible purpose corporations, and low-profit limited liability corporations. The 
Attorneys General of each state are charged as the implicit guardians of charity through the 
doctrine of parens patriae,115 and it does not matter if that charity comes from non-profit or for-
profit sources. If a benefit enforcement suit is unavailable or unsuccessful, shareholders could turn 
to the Attorney General of Arkansas, or any other state where the benefit corporation, flexible 
purpose corporation, or low-profit limited liability corporation is incorporated, to enforce the 
stated general or specific public purposes. For the Attorney General of a state to enforce a public 
purpose on a benefit corporation, flexible purpose corporation, or low-profit limited liability 
corporation, all that is needed is political will.  
C.  Quasi- Poison Pill 
An additional risk for a social impact investor in a benefit corporation is that a benefit 
corporation can alter its general or specific public purposes.116 This amendment can take place 
with a minimum status vote.117 However, encouraging benefit corporations to adopt a quasi-poison 
pill would discourage this practice.  
Poison pills are defensive measures historically used in an attempt to stop the hostile 
takeover of a corporation.118 Typically poison pills work by attaching latent rights to each share of 
a corporation's stock.119 When a triggering event occurs, usually the purchase 15% to 20% of a 
company's outstanding shares, the dormant rights are activated, and the holder is allowed to 
purchase new shares in the corporation at a highly discounted rate.120 A vital stipulation to poison 
 
115 Id. at 718. 
116 ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-36-201(d)(1) (West 2020). 
117 ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-36-201(d)(2) (West 2020). 
118 Joseph M. Grieco, The Ever-Evolving Poison Pill: The Pill in Asset Protection and Closely-Held 
Corporation Cases, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 625, 627 (2011). 
119 Id. at 628. 
120 Grieco, supra note 118, at 628. 
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pills is the person triggering the pill is not allowed to exercise his or her rights to purchase the 
discounted shares.121 This exception results in the dilution of the triggering party's ownership.122  
There is a two-part test developed in Unocal, applied in judicial review of a decision to 
activate a poison pill in the event of an attempted hostile takeover.123 First, directors must show 
they reasonably believed a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed.124 The court then 
determines if the pill was a reasonable measure in relation to the threat.125  
Not every poison pill case involves an attempted avoidance of a hostile takeover. In Versata 
Enterprises., Inc. v. Selectica, Inc., a poison pill was successfully used in a non-takeover situation 
involving the protection of corporate assets.126 However, in eBay,127 a poison pill failed in an 
attempt to protect corporate assets.128 Joseph Grieco makes a strong argument that had the court 
in eBay viewed the action as an attempt to protect corporate assets, the directors' decisions to 
implement the poison pill would have been upheld.129 Grieco additionally argues that the Unocal 
standard was adopted to assess the use of a poison pill in the event of a hostile takeover, not in 
internal events, and it should not apply in such cases.130  
In order to avoid the possibility of a benefit corporation arbitrarily amending its general or 
specific public purposes, Arkansas businesses should adopt a quasi-poison pill. This simple 
measure recognizes that a stated public purpose is a corporate asset. The quasi-poison pill would 
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public purposes. Triggering the quasi-poison pill would allow a dissenting shareholder to purchase 
more shares, at a steeply discounted rate, thereby increasing his or her voting power. Effectively 
thwarting any amendment that does not comport with the collective will of the shareholders.  
The purpose of the benefit corporation legislation is to give shareholders the power of 
public benefit enforcement and to give corporations the explicit freedom to pursue purposes other 
than shareholders' profits. The Benefit Corporation Act also requires that benefit corporations 
report annually on how they have worked towards their general public purpose.131 Benefit 
corporations being required to pursue their public purposes does not mean that traditional 
corporations cannot participate in CSR. It means that benefit corporations must and that they must 
be transparent in doing so.  
Not all agree that having an option to incorporate in a form that requires CSR is a good 
thing. Some fear that having two categories of companies is a problem.132 This fear highlights the 
importance of public perception. Whereas a benefit corporation may be favored on that designation 
alone, traditional companies might receive public condemnation in the absence of a benefit 
corporation designation despite those companies' legitimate CSR efforts.133 Critics fear that benefit 
corporations will use their designation as a disingenuous marketing strategy, and the legislation 
does not have a built-in mechanism to evaluate whether companies are exploiting their existence 
as benefit corporations.134   
Again, this concern is without merit. The Arkansas Benefit Corporation Act does not make 
people more likely to view traditional business as bad per se. Instead, the act allows companies 
and their shareholders the opportunity to be committed to a public benefit in addition to profit. If 
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investors and consumers are drawn to benefit corporations, then the legislation is doing exactly 
what it was created to accomplish—providing a framework for more socially conscious investing 
and consuming. Additionally, while the legislation may lack a built-in mechanism to evaluate 
whether companies are exploiting the benefit corporation legislation, the Attorney General can, 
and should, fill the gap as the guardian of charity under parens patriae.  
V. CONCLUSION 
 Regardless of whether shareholder profit maximization is a requirement of the law or 
simple outdated dicta, it is no longer the singular purpose of all for-profit business. There is money 
in morality, and more and more people are investing in socially conscious businesses. While some 
traditional corporate structures are being utilized for social purposes, the creation and adoption of 
benefit corporations, flexible purpose corporations, and low-profit limited liability corporations 
have provided a framework for entities to explicitly pursue more than just profit.135 However, the 
mechanisms in place currently do not offer stakeholder sufficient means with which to enforce a 
benefit corporation's stated general or specific public purposes.136 There are many ideas about how 
to strengthen the law to better hold benefit corporations, flexible purpose corporations, and low-
profit limited liability corporations accountable.  
Nevertheless, a suitable way to strengthen the power of social investors already exists, but 
it must be utilized: Each state's Attorney General is the implicit guardian of charity as prescribed 
by the common law doctrine of parens patriae.137 All that is necessary is the political will to apply 
that doctrine to the enforcement of stated general and specific public purposes.138 Furthermore, if 
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benefit corporations adopted a quasi-poison pill, investors would receive protection from shifting 
public purposes. In Arkansas, The Benefit Corporation Act adds to the legal landscape because, 
although traditional corporations are free to pursue purposes outside of profit maximization, 
benefit corporation legislation builds the foundation for shareholders to hold companies 
accountable for how they pursue public purposes. What is left is to strengthen enforcement of a 
benefit corporation's accountability towards its stated public purpose through the doctrine of 
parens patriae and the encouragement of a new adoption of a poison pill. 
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